(This is not in any way an aligned answer from a group, but this does reflect how I perceived — and participated in — some of the relevant discussions within NCA)
On the one hand, even combined weights combines the weights of your best candidates, so it is less «combined weights» than it sounds.
On the other hand, this makes the semantics of addition of scores complicated, too.
On the third hand, if SC needs to be able to represent community opinions in internal discussions, it is important for the process to work to trust at least one person there to represent the arguments from the contributors, including yours, well. It won’t be all about voting, the SC is small enough to also do some figuring out what’s going on.
On the fourth hand, there are skeletons in the closet for proportional-Condorcet in general in terms of what exactly the tallying produces, and there are drawbacks to STV too and some people like the general properties of Condorcet that still apply here and it’s all complicated. (The choice is limited to approaches with some proportionality and there are not that many available in terms of implementation)
On the fifth hand, it looks like ranked-choice popularity compared to range-voting is partially related to the fact that there are slightly more people for whom it is easier to rank than to score with any useful level of detail.
On the sixth hand, the popularity of ranked-choice voting provided us with an easier fallback as «rank as many as you wish» is available in many places and high-level-of-detail scores are more niche.
On the seventh hand, given that all approaches of summarising have significant complications and drawbacks, the question of limiting the level of detail the voter can swerat over to not too little not too much is relevant.
So it is all somewhat messy in any case, and the octopus says hi and waves with the eighth hand.